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FIRST LOOK
The Historical Evolution of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
by Michael C. Durst
Introduction
This chapter examines the evolution, over 
almost a century, of the body of international tax 
laws that continues to insulate BEPS-style 
planning arrangements from successful legal 
challenge in countries around the world. The 
chapter focuses on two aspects of current laws: (i) 
their acceptance of contractual arrangements, 
among members of commonly controlled 
multinational groups, that treat low- or zero-tax 
subsidiaries as conducting income-producing 
activities that they do not in physical reality 
perform; and (ii) the failure of current laws — 
specifically, “transfer pricing” laws, “controlled 
foreign corporation (CFC)” rules, and laws that 
seek to limit the payment of interest on loans from 
related parties — to place effective limits on the 
amount of profits that multinational companies 
are permitted to shift to zero- or low-tax affiliates 
under their contractual arrangements.
The Inherent Formalism of Corporate Tax Law
A starting point in the analysis is to recognize 
that corporate law, and the corporate income tax 
laws that represent a component of the broader 
law of corporations, are both pre-disposed to legal 
“formalism”: respect for the written terms of 
contractual arrangements even when they appear 
to depart from the apparent economic substance 
of the transactions that the contracts govern. A 
corporation is itself a legal fiction. The 
corporation’s existence as a legal entity is based 
upon the corporate charter, a document which 
grants shareholders assurance (subject to limited 
exceptions, as will be discussed presently) that 
they will not face personal liability for debts 
arising from business that is conducted in the 
corporation’s name.
The protection against liability that the 
corporate charter affords to shareholders often, in 
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practice, places a premium on the question 
whether a particular business activity is 
conducted by the corporation, in its capacity as a 
legal entity, or instead by the shareholders in their 
individual capacities. To prevent endless legal 
controversy over this question, the law long ago 
developed a strong presumption that if the 
contracts governing a business activity 
consistently treat the corporation rather than the 
shareholders as conducting the activity, that 
characterization normally will be respected. In 
light of this presumption, much of corporate legal 
practice consists of ensuring that the activities of a 
corporation are clearly documented by contracts 
in the name of the corporation rather than the 
shareholders, and that all the i’s are dotted and t’s 
crossed in those contracts.
The corporate law places some limits on the 
extent to which shareholders can shield 
themselves from liability through contracts 
specifying that a business is being conducted by 
the corporation as an entity, rather than its 
shareholders. Under the doctrine of “piercing the 
corporate veil,” some kinds of behavior by 
shareholders, like certain kinds of negligence, or 
the misleading of lenders or customers, can cause 
shareholders to become directly liable for 
obligations of a corporation.1 The law, however, 
typically permits piercing the corporate veil only 
in atypical circumstances. Generally, there is a 
strong presumption that if the applicable 
contracts identify a corporation rather than its 
shareholders as performing a business activity, 
the corporation should be treated as performing 
the activity for all purposes of the law.
There are countless circumstances in which 
the law respects a corporation as the performer of 
business activities, notwithstanding that 
corporate employees perform little if any physical 
activity. In particular, it generally is irrelevant 
whether a corporation performs business 
activities through its own employees or instead 
“outsources” the activity to other persons. For 
example, an investor might have the idea of 
manufacturing and distributing a particular kind 
of kitchen implement. The investor might form a 
corporation (let’s call it “Ladelco”) to accomplish 
these purposes. Ladelco might then contract with 
a separate company (“Manuco”) to (i) purchase 
the raw materials needed to manufacture the 
implements, (ii) perform the manufacturing, (iii) 
advertise the implement through on-line sellers, 
and (iv) accept orders from and ship products to 
customers. The contract may provide for Ladelco 
to compensate Manuco for these services by 
reimbursing that company for its costs plus a 
markup of, say, five percent. Any remaining profit 
is to be remitted to Ladelco, the initiator of the 
arrangement. (These kinds of “cost-plus” 
arrangements are quite common in practice.)
The law generally will, for all purposes, 
respect the various elements of this contractual 
arrangement, particularly (i) the rights of Manuco 
to receive its cost-plus compensation, but no 
more, in return for its services; and (ii) the right of 
Ladelco to receive all residual profits from the sale 
of the kitchen utensils. The law has no choice but 
generally to respect contractual formalities in 
situations like this and many others, since 
otherwise the law would have no practical means 
of sorting out the rights and liabilities of the 
various parties involved. Commerce would 
become chaotic. A high degree of formalism in 
corporate law, therefore, seems as a general 
matter to be unavoidable.
The corporate law’s high level of respect for 
the terms of contracts extends not only to 
contracts among unrelated companies like 
Ladelco and Manuco, but also to arrangements 
among corporations within the same, commonly 
owned group. In many instances, a group will 
desire to conduct several different business 
operations simultaneously — for example, to 
operate several different hotels in different 
locations. The group will place each operation in 
a separate subsidiary to shield the assets of each 
from claims arising from other operations. The 
use of multiple entities within a single group is 
especially frequent among businesses operating 
internationally; for many reasons, including the 
need to comply with different countries’ legal and 
tax requirements, operations in different 
countries are frequently placed in separate 
1
For a discussion of situations in which courts might choose to 
“pierce the corporate veil” and hold shareholders liable for corporate 
obligations, see, e.g., Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts, “Finding Order 
in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate 
Veil,” 100 Cornell Law Review 100 (2014). Courts generally are willing to 
pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances, like active 
misrepresentation by shareholders, or failure to maintain the procedural 
requirements of corporate existence under applicable law, are present.
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subsidiaries established under local law. It is in 
this manner that commonly owned multinational 
business groups typically are formed.
The parent and the various subsidiaries of 
multinational groups typically enter into 
numerous contracts among themselves, under 
which the different affiliates supply goods, 
provide services, and lend money to one another. 
Unless special factors are present to justify 
piercing the corporate veil, like the misleading of 
customers or outside lenders,2 courts will 
generally respect the division of responsibilities, 
and the rights to receive income, that are stated in 
the contracts into which the different group 
members have entered.
The corporate law’s respect for the terms of 
contracts made among both unrelated and related 
companies also extends, I believe inevitably, to 
countries’ corporate income tax laws. That is, for 
purposes of corporate income taxation, courts 
generally will respect the division of income 
among corporations that results from application 
of the corporations’ contractual arrangements 
with one another. This is not surprising: other 
than the contracts into which corporations have 
entered, tax authorities and courts would have no 
means of determining how much income each 
corporation should be treated as earning. (As will 
be discussed at some length below, the situation 
might be different if the countries of the world 
were to adopt an alternative means of dividing 
corporate income for tax purposes among 
commonly owned companies, perhaps through 
use of an apportionment formula. This approach, 
however, while often suggested by 
commentators, has consistently been rejected by 
national governments over the course of nearly a 
century.)
Respect for the terms of contractual 
arrangements among commonly owned 
companies is not absolute under countries’ 
corporate tax laws. Tax laws generally contain a 
doctrine of “substance over form.”3 (In some 
countries, the substance-over-form doctrine is 
explicitly included in tax statutes, under the label 
“general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR).”) The 
doctrine of substance-over-form in the tax law can 
be seen as somewhat analogous to that of piercing 
the veil in corporation law, in that both doctrines 
allow a “safety valve” to permit the overriding of 
formalistic results in especially compelling 
circumstances.4 Under the substance-over-form 
doctrine, courts may re-characterize the 
arrangements described in contracts between 
companies, if the economic reality of the 
arrangements plainly departs from their 
contractual form. Courts typically are willing, 
however, to apply the substance-over-form 
doctrine only in especially compelling 
circumstances, where a taxpayers’ contractual 
arrangements are very plainly contrived for tax-
avoidance purposes. To apply the substance-over-
form doctrine more readily would risk injecting 
an untenable degree of unpredictability to the 
operations of the corporate tax laws.
Thus, courts generally have not applied the 
doctrine to override the arguable legal fictions on 
which tax avoidance from BEPS-style planning 
arrangements depends. Despite the presence of 
the substance-over-form doctrine, courts often 
accept the desired tax consequences of the 
contractual arrangements made among 
companies, even where strong arguments can be 
made that the substance of the arrangements 
differs from its form. The tradition of formalism 
has long been, and remains, strong within the 
corporate income tax laws. It was against this 
background that the practice of BEPS-style tax 
planning was invented and, over the decades, 
became increasingly prevalent among the world’s 
multinational companies.
2
See generally John H. Matheson, “The Modern Law of Corporate 
Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-
Subsidiary Context,” 87 North Carolina Law Review 1091 (2009).
3
For a useful overview of the principle of substance-over-form, see, 
e.g., Brian J. Arnold, “The Role of a General Anti-Avoidance Rule in 
Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries,” in Alexander 
Trepelkov, Harry Tonino and Dominika Halka, eds., United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing 
Countries (2d ed. 2017) at 715-766. For an historical discussion, see David 
A. Weisbach, “Formalism in the Tax Law,” 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review 860 (1999).
4
The connection between the “corporate veil” doctrine and the 
problem of BEPS-style tax planning has, however, been noted by others. 
See the forthcoming essay by Scott Wilkie, “New Rules of Engagement? 
Corporate Personality and the Allocation of ‘International Income’ and 
Taxing Rights,” which includes an exploration of the topic and a review 
of prior literature.
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How the International Corporate Tax Laws 
Developed
Those areas of tax law that are most central to 
the history of base erosion and profit shifting 
around the world — transfer pricing laws, 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, and 
rules governing the extent to which companies 
can deduct interest paid to other members of their 
multinational groups — have developed in a long 
historical arc, beginning early in the Twentieth 
Century and continuing through the present. The 
following summarizes important aspects of this 
history, beginning with the early statement of the 
principles of international corporate tax law 
under League of Nations auspices beginning in 
the 1920s, through the attempt by the United 
States to adjust its international tax laws to post-
World War II economic realities in the U.S. 
Revenue Act of 1962, and culminating in the 
“transfer pricing wars” of the early 1990s, which 
gave rise to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
in roughly the form they have today. Chapter 4 
will then describe how the world’s governments 
are trying to resolve, through the OECD’s BEPS 
process, problems that have accumulated during 
this long history.
The Period Between the Two World Wars: 
Pre-Occupation with ‘Double Taxation’
After the First World War, three factors 
combined to direct attention among the countries 
of the world to the task of designing a workable 
system of international tax laws.5 These included 
(i) the increasing international trade and 
investment made possible by the ending of the 
War; (ii) widespread increases in tax rates around 
the world; and (iii) the emergence of international 
organizations, notably the League of Nations and, 
within the private sector, the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), an organization of 
business leaders organized in Paris, in 1919.6
The ICC initiated the post-War discussion of 
international tax laws. In particular, the ICC 
sought the assistance of the League of Nations in 
dsigning a system of laws that would permit 
companies to avoid “double taxation” under 
corporate income tax laws when engaging in 
business spanning national boundaries. The basic 
concept of double taxation is easy to understand:
Consider a company based in Italy that 
manufacturers automobiles (a “hot” 
consumer product in the years after World 
War I) for the U.K. market. The company 
manufactures the cars in Italy, then sells 
and ships them to a wholly owned 
distribution subsidiary established in the 
United Kingdom, which then sells them to 
independent car dealerships around the 
country. Assume that the Italian-based 
group as a whole, during a particular year, 
earns total net income of $100 million from 
the manufacture of the cars in Italy and 
their marketing and sale in the United 
Kingdom. Of this income, how much is 
properly taxable by Italy and how much 
by the United Kingdom? In the absence of 
rules establishing some means of 
apportionment, the Italian tax authority is 
likely to argue that the lion’s share of the 
income is attributable to the excellent 
design and skillful manufacturing of the 
cars, which both occurred in Italy. The 
U.K. tax authority is likely to argue that 
the lion’s share of the income is 
attributable to the skillful advertisement, 
marketing and customer service activities 
that took place in the United Kingdom. 
Both Italy and the United Kingdom, 
therefore, might assert the right to tax a 
majority of the income from the 
manufacture and sale of cars, leaving the 
Italy-based company with an inflated total 
tax bill.
5
For important historical discussions of the development of 
international tax law between the Wars, see Richard S. Collier & Joseph 
L. Andrus, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle after BEPS 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 6-49; Mitchell B. Carroll, 
“Allocation of Business Income: The Draft Convention of the League of 
Nations,” 34 Columbia Law Review 473 (1934); Sol Picciotto, International 
Business Taxation: A Study in the Internationalization of Business 
Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992, as revised by 
author 2013); Thomas Rixen, “From Double Tax Avoidance to Tax 
Competition,” 2010 Review of International Political Economy 1; and two 
articles by Brett Wells & Cym Lowell, “Tax Base Erosion and Homeless 
Income: Collection at Source is the Linchpin,” 65 Tax Law Review 535 
(2012) and “Income Tax Policy in the 21st Century: Residence vs. 
Source,” 5 Columbia Journal of Tax Law 1 (2013). The historical summary 
in this book is based largely on these resources.
6
Collier & Andrus, note 5 above, at 8.
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The ICC argued after the First World War that 
if the threat of double taxation was not to pose a 
serious impediment to international commerce, 
some reliable means needed to be found for 
apportioning income, for tax purposes, among the 
different countries in which an international 
business operates. This problem later came to be 
referred to as the “transfer pricing” problem; and 
as explained at various points throughout this 
book, it remains central to the topic of base 
erosion and profit shifting today. In response, the 
League of Nations initiated a process of studying 
the problem of income apportionment and 
numerous other important problems of 
international taxation, which extended until the 
outbreak of the Second World War.7
From the start of their review of the transfer 
pricing problem, those conducting the League’s 
study had before them two competing policy 
models, which continue to figure prominently in 
international tax policy debates: a model of 
“formulary apportionment” (generally referred to 
at the time of the League of Nations studies as 
“fractional” apportionment); and (ii) “separate 
accounting.” Under formulary apportionment, 
governments of different countries treat all the 
members of a multinational group as a single 
taxable entity, and apportion the group’s 
combined income among countries according to a 
formula. Consider, for example, a manufacturing 
group that sells products through affiliates in 
three different countries.
As a simple kind of formulary apportionment, 
the governments of the three countries might 
agree to treat the group as a single taxable entity, 
and to divide the group’s total income among the 
countries according to the relative levels of sales 
to customers by the different affiliates. Thus, for 
example, if the affiliate in Country A accounts for 
half the group’s total sales, then half the group’s 
combined income would be taxable in Country A; 
if fifteen percent of the sales were made in 
Country B, fifteen percent of the group’s 
combined income would be taxable there; and so 
on.
A feature of formulary apportionment, which 
has lent controversy to the topic over the decades, 
is that under a formulary system, large amounts 
of income could not be attributed to companies 
within multinational groups that perform few if 
any observable business activities, as is typically 
true of the low- and zero-tax subsidiaries that are 
used in BEPS-style tax planning.
In reviewing the possibility of international 
formulary apportionment, the League examined 
three then-existing instances in which 
jurisdictions were using formulary 
apportionment for tax purposes: the states of the 
United States, the cantons of Switzerland, and 
Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia under a 
treaty implemented after the First World War.8 
These three systems employed various kinds of 
apportionment formulas, in which not only sales 
but other indicators of corporate activity, like the 
value of business assets owned or local payroll 
expenses of different members of the group, were 
taken into account.
Not only was there precedent for the use of 
formulary apportionment for the division of 
taxable income among affiliates, but the ICC itself 
had suggested a formulary approach in its early 
communications with the League of Nations.9 The 
League’s experts, however, concluded that a 
system of international formulary apportionment 
did not offer practical promise for the prevention 
of double taxation. The primary objection to 
formulary apportionment appears to have been 
(as often is argued today) that different countries 
7
In addition to addressing the problem of methods for apportioning 
income, the League of Nations’ efforts considered the important 
problems of (i) how an internationally coordinated system of tax rules 
might be implemented through a system of income tax treaties among 
countries (a topic to be addressed in Chapter 4 of this book); and (ii) how 
the right to tax income of an international business group should be 
divided between the group’s country of “residence” (i.e., its home 
country) and the various other countries in which members of the group 
earn income from conducting business operations (“source” countries).
This book does not seek to address an important problem that 
figured prominently in the League of Nations discussions and continues 
to pose serious technical difficulties in tax policymaking and tax 
administration today: the fact that multinational groups operate in 
countries around the world through two different kinds of legal entities, 
separately incorporated subsidiaries and unincorporated branches of 
parent companies. (For a recent discussion of this problem, see OECD, 
“Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 7: Additional Guidance on the 
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments” (June 2017).) 
Questions related to the differing tax treatment of subsidiaries and 
branches are of substantial practical importance in international tax 
practice and lawmaking, although trying to discuss this highly technical 
topic in this book would risk unhelpfully distracting non-specialist 
readers from the book’s central policy themes.
8
See Carroll, note 5 above, at 481, 488-489, 491-494.
9
See Wells & Lowell (2013), note 5 above, at 14-18.
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would adopt and apply differing apportionment 
formulas, inevitably giving rise to overlapping 
claims of tax jurisdiction and therefore to double 
taxation.10
For these reasons, the League established 
“separate accounting” as its basic principle for the 
international division of income for tax 
purposes.11 Under this principle, there is no 
attempt to consolidate the accounts of different 
affiliates within a multinational group. Instead, 
the separate books and records of each affiliate, 
which are, of course, a reflection of the results of 
the contracts under which the affiliate conducts 
business, are accepted as valid for tax purposes, 
unless the taxpayer appears to have been 
departing from normal business principles in 
dealings with its affiliates, with the result of 
artificially reducing its taxable income. In other 
words, the contracts and other business 
arrangements of each member of a commonly 
owned group are to be respected for tax purposes, 
unless the tax authority can show that the 
member has departed from what has, over the 
years, become known as the “arm’s-length 
principle” in its dealings with other members.12
The League of Nations discussions addressed 
the important question of how tax authorities 
might enforce the separate-accounting approach, 
with its underlying arm’s-length principle. The 
League envisioned generally that in those cases 
where comparable prices can be found for a 
group’s internal dealings, as where, say, a 
manufacturing affiliate sells identical products to 
both related and unrelated parties, the 
comparable price should be used to determine 
whether intragroup dealings have been at arm’s-
length. The League provided only limited 
guidance for tax authorities to use in the many 
situations in which “comparable” prices are not 
readily available. The League did, however, 
indicate that two methods, which already were 
used by some tax authorities, could be useful.13
First, tax authorities could employ a 
“fractional” approach, under which the income of 
different affiliates is split between them according 
to an ad hoc formula (for example, based on 
relative sales levels and manufacturing costs) 
devised for the taxpayer. This approach (which as 
will be seen below survives today in the form of 
the “profit split” transfer pricing method) was, 
according to the League’s analysis, sharply 
distinguishable from a “formulary” approach, 
under which a single formula would be applied to 
all taxpayers on a “one size fits all” basis. A 
second approach accepted by the League, in the 
absence of useful comparables, was an 
“empirical” approach, under which tax 
authorities sought to identify a reasonable profit 
margin on sales for companies operating within 
their countries. The “empirical” approach 
survives today in the form of the “transactional 
net margin method (TNMM)” of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which as will be seen 
below plays an especially important role in the 
taxation of businesses operating in lower-income 
countries.
The arm’s-length principle can be seen as a 
kind of substance-over-form rule, under which a 
commonly owned group’s contractual 
arrangements will be respected for tax purposes 
unless the arrangements are inconsistent with 
those that might be found among unrelated 
entities, dealing with each other in an arm’s-
length manner. It was inevitable from the outset 
that courts would exercise restraint in applying 
the new arm’s-length standard to re-characterize 
taxpayers’ contractual arrangements, for the same 
reason that courts are reluctant to apply the 
substance-over-form doctrine as a general matter. 
Excessive eagerness by courts in over-riding 
companies’ contractual arrangements would 
inject uncertainty into the international tax laws, 
and this uncertainty could be a significant 
obstacle to commerce. Therefore, the League’s 
approach created an obvious danger that 
commonly owned groups of companies might be 
10
See Carroll, note 5 above, at 473-476.
11
One particular expert commissioned by the League of Nations, 
Mitchell B. Carroll of the United States (the author of the article by 
Carroll cited at various points in this chapter) played an especially 
influential role in the later stages of the League’s deliberations, in the late 
1920s and 1930s. In the 1980s, a prominent commentary strongly 
criticized Carroll’s analytical work, claiming that it overstated the 
difficulties of formulary apportionment. Stanley I. Langbein, “The 
Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length,” Tax Notes, Feb. 17, 1986, 
at 625, 632-633.
12
Collier & Andrus, note 5 above at 33, note use of the words “arm’s 
length” by Mitchell Carroll in the early 1930s.
13
See Carroll, note 5 above, at 484-485.
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able, without serious risk of successful legal 
challenge, to engineer their contractual 
arrangements to steer income artificially to 
companies that the groups could establish in low-
tax countries.14
Although participants in the League debates 
recognized the possibility that the arm’s-length 
approach might be used to facilitate international 
tax avoidance, those steering the League of 
Nations’ efforts were much more concerned with 
what they saw as their immediate goal of 
avoiding double taxation, than they were of tax-
avoidance practices that might arise in the 
future.15 As the main danger perceived was that of 
over-reaching by tax examiners in different 
countries, it was quite logical for the League to 
lean, consciously or not, toward a regulatory 
regime that tax authorities would find relatively 
difficult to enforce. Excessive interference by tax 
authorities with the intended results of taxpayers’ 
transactions would risk subjecting the taxpayers 
to inconsistent treatment by different countries, 
resulting in double taxation.
Another important aspect of the League of 
Nations study, with implications for lower-
income countries today, is the role played by a 
particular model of international business 
operations, the “mercantilist paradigm” in 
shaping the League’s perceptions concerning 
what constitutes arm’s-length arrangements 
among affiliates.16 In the interwar years, a large 
amount of international commerce consisted of 
trade in commodities, like mineral and 
agricultural products, between parent companies 
headquartered in countries holding overseas 
colonies, and corporate subsidiaries that had been 
established in the colonized countries. The 
League’s analyses reflected the idea that in 
dividing income between the parent and the 
colonial subsidiary, the natural approach was to 
apportion to the subsidiary a relatively limited 
amount of income in return for its activities in 
growing or extracting physical product, with the 
rest of the parent’s and subsidiary’s combined 
income treated as attributable to the parent’s role 
in providing investment capital and overall 
supervision, and therefore taxable to the parent 
company. The mercantilist model obviously 
reflected paternalistic assumptions regarding the 
economic role of colonial dependencies; it also 
may have reflected a desire by colonial powers to 
encourage foreign direct investment in their 
colonies by limiting the taxable income 
attributable to colonial enterprises.17
Whatever the League’s motivation for 
propagating the mercantilist model, it has had a 
lasting effect on the vocabulary and imagery of 
international tax law. International tax rules 
continue to rely heavily on a conceptual paradigm 
under which developing countries typically are 
envisioned as “source” countries where 
supposedly uncomplicated (“routine” in the 
parlance often used by tax practitioners) activities 
like farming, mining, the performance of services 
in places like call centers, and basic 
manufacturing operations take place; and 
wealthier countries are seen as “residence” 
countries that provide the capital, as well as the 
valuable intellectual property, that are used in the 
operations conducted in the source countries.18 As 
will be seen later in this chapter, the persistence of 
this imagery has helped lend legitimacy to tax 
planning structures under which subsidiaries of 
multinational groups operating in lower-income 
countries tend to be apportioned very low levels 
of income in return for the “routine” activities 
they are treated as performing. Moreover, the 
desire to encourage inbound investment has led 
many developing countries to tolerate the 
perpetuation of the model, even though it tends to 
apportion to those countries relatively limited 
amounts of taxable income.
14
See Wells & Lowell (2012), note 5 above, at 561 ff.; Rixen, note 5 
above, passim.
15
Wells & Lowell (2012), note 5 above, at 563; Rixen, note 5 above, at 
15.
16
See Wells & Lowell (2013), note 5 above, at 10-13, on which the 
discussion below is largely based. See also Carroll, note 5 above, at 474-
476.
17
See Peter Duignan & L.H. Gann, eds., Colonialism in Africa 1870-
1960, vol. 4 (Stanford: Hoover Institution 1975) at 8:
From the very beginning, colonial governments sought to make 
colonies pay. They encouraged investors, bankers, traders, 
plantation owners and business groups. Tax systems were drawn 
up to attract investment.
18
Thought-provoking analyses of the development of the concepts of 
“source” and “residence” are provided by Michael J. Graetz & Michael 
M. O’Hear, “The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation,” 51 
Duke Law Journal 1021 (1997); and Wells & Lowell (2013), note 5 above.
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Emergence of BEPS-Style Tax Planning in the 
Aftermath of World War II
At the end of the Second World War, foreign 
direct investment resumed with unprecedented 
intensity, especially from the United States, the 
industrial infrastructure of which was 
undamaged. In the early post-War years, former 
combatant countries needed foreign capital to 
rebuild their physical infrastructures. The 
colonial system also began to dissolve, leading to 
a desire for cross-border economic development 
in the former dependencies. Wartime innovations 
in communications and transportation 
technologies eased the task of managing 
multinational businesses on a centralized basis, 
and increased the speed and reliability which 
products and services could be delivered 
internationally. Further, wartime technological 
developments, for example in antibiotics and 
other pharmaceuticals, gave rise to global 
demand for high-value, easily transportable 
products.
Companies needed to devise corporate legal 
structures through which to conduct their rapidly 
expanding international operations. Consider, for 
example, a U.S.-based pharmaceutical company 
that wished to expand sales of products to 
numerous countries on five continents. An initial 
question facing the group would have been 
whether to operate, in countries around the 
world, through separately incorporated local 
subsidiaries or through unincorporated branches 
of the U.S. parent company. Even leaving aside tax 
considerations, several factors would have 
encouraged the establishment of separately 
incorporated subsidiaries. Reasons for this would 
have included a desire to limit cross-liability for 
claims against the different national operations of 
the group; in addition, separately incorporated 
subsidiaries might have been needed to comply 
with countries’ requirements that, say, local 
citizens serve on companies’ boards of directors.
Moreover, a number of business and tax 
considerations encouraged multinationals to 
adopt a particular corporate structure that soon 
became central to BEPS-style tax planning: the use 
of holding companies in low- or zero-tax 
countries to own the stock of companies 
established in the various countries in which the 
group conducted business. For example, if a U.S.-
based multinational group established 
subsidiaries in, say, France, the United Kingdom 
and Spain, it would naturally have arranged for 
the U.S. parent company not to own the stock of 
the French, British, and Spanish entities directly, 
but instead through a holding company 
established in a low- or zero-tax country like, say, 
Panama.19 The group could then accumulate 
earnings from all three foreign operating entities 
in the holding company without incurring 
significant local Panamanian tax, and reinvest the 
earnings abroad wherever the group desired. 
There was no need to distribute the foreign 
earnings all the way up to the group’s parent 
company where they would have become subject 
to U.S. tax.20 The use of the holding company 
structure also could simplify the task of 
accumulating and reinvesting profits under the 
restrictive national currency-exchange 
regulations that were common around the world 
during the post-War era.21 Thus, the basic three-
tier corporate structure, with a zero- or low-tax 
holding company in the middle, quickly became 
standard for multinational companies expanding 
their international operations after World War II.
Once the model of a zero- or low-tax holding 
company structure was in place, the technique of 
shifting income from the operating subsidiaries to 
the holding company through, for example, 
intangibles-licensing and lending arrangements, 
would have been apparent to tax planners. In 
theory, the amounts shifted from the operating 
subsidiaries to the low- or zero-tax holding 
company should have been limited by the arm’s-
19
See generally E.R. Barlow & Ira T. Wender, Foreign Investment and 
Taxation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School International Program in 
Taxation, 1955) at 168-170. Barlow & Wender mention Panama, Canada, 
Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Liechtenstein as countries that hosted 
international holding companies.
20
In the post-World War II era, the tax laws of countries around the 
world generally subjected the parent companies of multinational groups 
to taxation on income from their foreign subsidiaries only when that 
income was “repatriated” to the parent in the form of dividends. 
Therefore, the use of separate entities delayed the premature home-
country taxation of foreign earnings. In recent decades, most countries in 
which multinationals tend to be based (including, as of 2018, the United 
States) have adopted “territorial” systems under which dividends from 
foreign subsidiaries are exempt from home-country taxation, even when 
repatriated. Thus, the dynamics of international tax planning have to 
some extent changed. Multinationals still, though, generally have a 
number of reasons, apart from any tax-avoidance planning in which 
they might be involved, to operate in countries through separate legal 
entities.
21
Barlow & Wender, note 19 above, at 168.
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length standard. That is, the holding companies 
should have been permitted to charge only arm’s-
length royalty amounts under their licensing 
arrangements with the operating companies, and 
the holding companies should have extended to 
the operating companies only economically 
reasonable amounts of interest-bearing debt. In 
practice, however, the arm’s-length principle 
appears to have exerted little restraint on the 
growth of BEPS-style tax planning around the 
world, and BEPS-style planning grew over the 
years to become standard practice among 
multinational groups.
Post-War Legislative Developments in the 
United States
The United States, which served as the source 
for much of the world’s cross-border investment 
in the years following World War II, appears to 
have been the first country to perceive profit 
shifting by its home-based multinationals as 
posing a significant public policy issue. At first, in 
the immediate post-War years, U.S. officials 
generally took a benign view of the avoidance of 
tax by U.S. firms from their foreign operations.22 
U.S. policy-makers apparently saw foreign direct 
investment by U.S. firms as a useful adjunct to the 
Marshall Plan in stimulating economic recovery 
among war-damaged countries, as well as an aid 
in competing with the Soviet Union for influence 
in post-colonial areas.
By the early 1960s, however, important 
political actors in the United States began to 
perceive that outbound investment by U.S.-based 
multinationals had blossomed into too much of a 
good thing. The ex-combatant countries had 
largely completed their post-War reconstruction, 
and some were becoming potent economic 
competitors of the United States. Also, in an era 
when national currencies were still backed by a 
country’s gold reserves, outbound investment 
was contributing to chronically large balance-of-
payments deficits, placing pressure on the 
valuation of the dollar.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy released a 
message to Congress urging action to end the 
deferral of U.S. taxation on income earned by 
foreign companies within U.S.-owned 
multinational groups.23 This would have made it 
pointless for U.S.-based multinationals to 
accumulate foreign income in holding companies, 
and also generally would have removed the 
benefit to U.S.-based groups from any explicit 
exemptions, like tax holidays, offered by a 
country to investors, since income untaxed by the 
host country would have become immediately 
taxable in the United States. The Kennedy 
proposal contained a carve-out for explicit 
exemptions provided by specified 
“underdeveloped” countries, on the condition 
that the exempted income was reinvested in the 
underdeveloped country. Income exempted from 
taxation only implicitly, however, through what 
the Kennedy proposal referred to as “tax haven” 
planning devices, would be subject to immediate 
U.S. taxation under all circumstances.24 If enacted, 
therefore, the Kennedy proposal to eliminate 
deferral would have ended BEPS-style tax 
planning by U.S. multinational groups.
Business interests, however, expressed the 
view that the elimination of deferral would place 
U.S.-based multinationals at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to their non-U.S. 
competitors, who would remain permitted to 
avail themselves of tax exemptions offered by 
countries around the world. Ultimately, the 
Congress passed and the President signed, in 
what became the Revenue Act of 1962, legislation 
that stopped short of the full elimination of 
deferral, but that attempted to curtail the use of 
tax planning by U.S.-based multinationals 
centered on holding companies established in 
zero- or low-tax countries.
22
For contemporaneous discussion of this topic, see id., at 77-94.
23
President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on 
Taxation, April 20, 1961.
24
The language used by President Kennedy in describing these 
avoidance devices makes clear that by 1961, BEPS-style tax avoidance 
planning had taken on essentially the same form as it displays today. 
Kennedy said:
The undesirability of continuing deferral is underscored where 
deferral has served as a shelter for tax escape through the 
unjustifiable use of tax havens such as Switzerland. Recently more 
and more enterprises organized abroad by American firms have 
arranged their corporate structures — aided by artificial 
arrangements between parent and subsidiary regarding 
intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights, the 
shifting of management fees, and similar practices which maximize 
the accumulation of profits in the tax haven — so as to exploit the 
multiplicity of foreign tax systems and international agreements in 
order to reduce sharply or eliminate completely their tax liabilities 
both at home and abroad.
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Congress made two important decisions in the 
1962 Act, which ended up having long-term 
effects on the shape of international tax rules 
around the world. First, Congress adopted the 
world’s first body of “controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC)” rules, by which the United 
States and many other countries have sought, 
generally without success, to limit their 
multinational groups’ involvement in BEPS-style 
tax planning. Second, Congress considered, but 
rejected, a proposal to adopt a system of 
formulary apportionment for the international 
division of income earned by related-party 
groups, instead reaffirming a commitment to the 
arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing which 
had been developed under the auspices of the 
League of Nations.The following discussion 
offers an introduction to both CFC rules and post-
War arm’s-length transfer pricing rules, as they 
have developed globally in the more than fifty 
years that have elapsed since the 1962 U.S. 
legislation.
Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) Rules
The Revenue Act of 1962 generally defined as 
a “controlled foreign corporation (CFC)” any 
foreign corporation that was more than 50-
percent owned by U.S. corporate or individual 
shareholders.25 Therefore, the foreign subsidiaries 
of U.S.-owned multinational groups generally fell 
within the definition of CFCs. If a CFC was 
located in a country with a low or zero tax rate, 
any income received by the CFC, falling within 
specified categories, would be subject to 
immediate U.S. taxation as if the income had been 
repatriated to the United States. The categories of 
“tainted” income included interest, royalties, and 
profits from purchases or sales of goods and 
services to or from related parties — precisely the 
kinds of income transferred to zero- or low-tax 
subsidiaries under BEPS-style tax avoidance 
planning. The 1962 U.S. CFC rules, therefore, if 
they had worked as intended, would have 
removed from U.S.-based multinationals the 
financial incentive to pull income from foreign 
subsidiaries into offshore collection points, and 
presumably would have dramatically reduced 
U.S. companies’ involvement in BEPS-style tax 
avoidance structures.
From the time of their enactment in 1962, 
however, the effectiveness of the U.S. CFC rules in 
discouraging BEPS-style tax planning has been 
limited. In part, problems have arisen from 
weaknesses in the verbal structure of the statute. 
For example, the 1962 legislation defined a CFC as 
a company that is more than 50 percent owned, by 
vote or value, by a U.S. parent company or certain 
other U.S. shareholders. But the “more than 50 
percent by vote or value” test proved susceptible 
of manipulation. For example, there are an infinite 
number of ways in which voting rights can be 
spread among different classes of a corporation’s 
stock (with, for example, some shares given 
voting rights for some purposes rather than 
others); and it can be very difficult to assign 
values to particular classes of stock with unique 
voting or other rights. It soon proved possible to 
avoid classification as a CFC of some companies 
that appeared as a practical matter to be 
controlled by U.S. shareholders.
Similarly, the language defining the kinds of 
payments that are subject to home-country 
taxation under CFC rules raises difficulties. For 
example, “interest” received by a CFC in a low- or 
zero-tax country generally is subject to home-
country taxation under the U.S. CFC rules, but if 
the CFC also performs some banking services for 
unrelated customers — something that can easily 
be arranged among friendly multinationals — its 
interest income may, under complex rules, qualify 
as “active financing” income and therefore as 
exempt from home-country taxation.
As another example, although the U.S. CFC 
rules generally tax income of a zero- or low-tax 
CFC from purchasing and reselling property in 
related-party transactions, the rules do not apply 
this treatment if the low- or zero-tax company 
substantially transforms the property through 
manufacturing processes (that is, the CFC rules 
provide a “manufacturing exception”). Early in 
the history of the U.S. CFC rules, U.S. 
multinationals adopted “contract manufacturing” 
25
The following discussion in the text seeks to provide only 
nontechnical and simplified descriptions of the CFC rules of the United 
States and other countries. More detailed background on CFC rules 
around the world can be found in the OECD’s BEPS report, “Designing 
Effective Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules” (2015); Office of Tax 
Policy, United States Treasury, “The Deferral of Income Earned through 
U.S. Corporations” (2000); and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Oz Halabi, “US 
Subpart F Legislative Proposals: A Comparative Perspective,” University 
of Michigan Law & Economics Working Papers (2012).
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arrangements under which CFCs claimed the 
right to the manufacturing exception by virtue not 
of their own manufacturing activities, but of 
manufacturing performed by others under 
contract. Over time, contract manufacturing 
arrangements, which U.S. tax authorities 
generally proved unable legally to curtail, have 
been used to escape much taxation under the CFC 
rules.26
Finally, in 1997, an unexpected regulatory 
incident in the United States delivered the coup 
de grace to the U.S. CFC rules as meaningful 
constraints on BEPS-style planning by U.S. 
multinationals.27 The IRS issued a regulation that 
apparently was intended to simplify, under U.S. 
tax rules, the process of qualifying business 
entities as partnerships or other forms of pass-
through entities (like limited liability companies) 
for tax purposes, thereby providing the entities 
with tax advantages in certain circumstances. 
There is no indication that this simplification was 
intended fundamentally to alter the operation of 
the CFC rules. The new regulation, however, 
contained language to the effect that in some 
circumstances, entities qualifying for pass-
through classification would be treated “for all 
purposes of U.S. taxation” as transparent entities 
— that is, treated as if they did not exist.
Immediately, U.S. multinationals recognized 
that they could structure their operating entities 
in various countries around the world as 
subsidiaries of low- and zero-tax companies 
within the group, and then cause the operating 
subsidiaries to “check the box” so that they would 
be treated not as separate companies for U.S. tax 
purposes, but instead as unincorporated branches 
of the low- or zero-tax companies. This means, as 
a formal legal matter, that payments of interest, 
royalties, and other kinds of passive income made 
by the operating companies to their low- or zero-
tax parents weren’t “payments” at all — they 
were, as a formal matter, non-events — so that the 
low- or zero-tax company should not be treated as 
receiving CFC income.
The U.S. IRS and Treasury quickly announced 
their intention to modify the recently issued 
regulations to clarify that they could not be 
applied to defeat operation of the CFC rules. But 
once the horse of the check-the-box regulations 
had left the barn, it was politically impossible for 
the Treasury to retrieve it. Businesses argued that 
to restore the U.S. CFC rules to health would place 
U.S.-owned multinationals at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to their foreign 
counterparts. Supporting the business position, 
Congress made clear that it would legislatively 
block action to limit the operation of the check-
the-box rules in a way that would resuscitate the 
CFC rules; and indeed in 2006 Congress enacted 
legislation that effectively confirmed this 
position. The result is that since 1997, the U.S. CFC 
rules have been of little effect in limiting the 
participation of U.S.-based multinationals in 
BEPS-style tax planning.
Since 1972, dozens of countries have adopted 
CFC rules that are at least broadly similar to those 
of the United States.28 Inevitably, however, these 
CFC rules have been vulnerable to the same kinds 
of definitional ambiguities that impaired the 
operation of the U.S. CFC rules, even before the 
final blow of the check-the-box regulations. It is 
not clear how successful different countries’ CFC 
rules have been in curtailing BEPS-style tax 
planning among multinationals based outside the 
United States; my experience as a practitioner 
suggests that the degree of effectiveness has 
varied substantially among countries. The large 
volumes of avoidance visible around the world 
today, however, suggest that overall, CFC rules 
have operated at a low level of efficacy.
The basic problem with CFC rules, which very 
likely has prevented them historically from 
interfering decisively with the growth of BEPS, 
relates to competition among capital-exporting 
countries: the countries where multinational 
groups tend to be based. A country’s CFC rules 
prevent that country’s own, home-based 
multinationals from benefiting from BEPS-style 
tax planning in countries where they conduct 
business. The multinationals of other countries, 
26
For an historical discussion, see Stephen R.A. Bates & Derrick A. 
Kirkwood, “Contract Manufacturing: Is the War Over?” Tax Notes Int’l, 
Apr. 7, 2008, p. 61.
27
The history of the check-the-box rules is described in, e.g., David R. 
Sicular, “The New Look-Through Rule: W(h)ither Subpart F?” Tax Notes, 
Apr. 23, 2007, p. 349.
28
The OECD’s 2015 final report on BEPS Action 3, “Designing 
Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules,” at page 9, notes that 30 of 
the countries participating in the BEPS deliberations had CFC rules.
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however, that have not enacted CFC rules remain 
free to engage in the tax planning. Countries 
therefore tend to be reluctant to enact effective 
CFC rules, which can be seen as placing their 
home-based multinational companies at a 
competitive disadvantage.29
Chapter 4 will give further attention to the 
topic of CFC rules, in the course of a discussion of 
the OECD’s BEPS recommendations. As will be 
seen, in its 2015 BEPS reports, the OECD, while 
noting the possible value of CFC rules in 
curtailing BEPS-style tax planning, does not offer 
concrete recommendations for their 
strengthening. Conceivably, the adoption of 
effective CFC rules would be made more feasible 
if all, or at least most, capital-exporting countries 
were willing to adopt the rules in concert. The 
BEPS process, though, did not offer concrete 
suggestions for international coordination of CFC 
rules, and as an overall matter did not display 
optimism that the institution of CFC rules would 
be reinvigorated around the world soon.
As I will discuss further in Chapter 4, 
however, in its December 2017 tax reform 
legislation, the United States enacted a new tax on 
the “global intangible low-tax income (GILTI)” of 
U.S.-owned corporate groups.30 The GILTI rules 
are complex; their overall intention is to impose a 
U.S. tax on much of a U.S. group’s foreign income, 
at a rate of about 10.5 percent, to the extent the 
group’s foreign income was not subject to foreign 
taxes of at least that rate. The GILTI tax therefore 
imposes a “minimum tax” on a U.S. group’s low-
tax foreign income. The GILTI tax serves much the 
same purpose as a CFC rule. Chapter 4 will 
consider whether, despite the reserved tone taken 
toward CFC rules in the BEPS report, U.S. 
adoption of the GILTI tax might signal a revival of 
the concept of CFC rules as means of controlling 
BEPS-style tax planning.
Post-1962 Transfer Pricing Laws
In addition to CFC rules, the U.S. Congress in 
1962 focused on the possibility of strengthening 
the arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing. 
Legislative consideration of transfer pricing rules, 
in what became the Tax Reform Act of 1962, began 
in a perhaps surprising manner.31 The House of 
Representatives (the lower house of the U.S. 
Congress, where revenue-raising legislation must 
originate) approved a provision under which, in 
sales of tangible property between related parties, 
if a comparable price could not be identified, 
income from the production, purchase and resale 
of the property generally was to be divided 
among entities according to a formula based on 
companies’ assets, payroll expenses, and 
advertising expenses. The formulary method was 
to apply only to related-party transfers of tangible 
property, so it is not clear how the method would 
have applied in connection with avoidance 
planning involving transfers of rights to 
intangibles or of services. The formulary method 
also would not have applied if relevant 
comparable prices could be found, or if the 
taxpayer could agree upon a more accurate 
transfer pricing methodology with the U.S. tax 
authorities.
Businesses objected strongly to the House 
proposal, claiming both that the legislation was 
unacceptably vague, and that applying a single 
formula to many different factual circumstances 
would inevitably lead to unfair results. When the 
House-passed bill was transmitted to the U.S. 
Senate for its consideration, the Senate eliminated 
the formulary-apportionment provision from 
subsequent versions of the legislation. Ultimately, 
in the 1962 Act, Congress decided against making 
any change to existing transfer-pricing law, thus 
in effect retaining the “arm’s-length” approach as 
it had been developed by the League of Nations. 
Congress, however, directed the U.S. Treasury 
29
See generally Michael C. Durst, “Self-Help and Altruism: 
Protecting Developing Countries’ Tax Revenues,” in Thomas Pogge & 
Krishen Mehta, eds., Global Tax Fairness (Oxford & NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) at 316.
30
The new GILTI tax is contained in Section 951A of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code.
31
The following discussion of the 1962 Revenue Act, and ensuing 
transfer pricing regulations of 1968, in the United States is based on 
Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson, “Clearing Away the Sand: 
Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer 
Pricing Today,” 57 Tax Law Review 37, 48-58 (2003), and the authorities 
cited therein.
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Department to re-examine the question whether 
additional regulations might be needed to govern 
transfer pricing. Congress directed the Treasury 
specifically to consider whether regulations 
should include “guidelines and formulas for the 
allocation of income and deductions.”
In 1968, after a substantial delay, the U.S. 
Treasury issued transfer pricing regulations in 
response to Congress’s request. The new 
regulations generally rejected Congress’s 1962 
invitation to consider the use of “formulas.” 
Instead, the 1968 regulations introduced the idea 
of transfer-pricing guidelines, which the new 
regulations called “methods”; and it was clear 
that these methods were to be governed by the 
arm’s-length principle, with its heavy dependence 
on information derived from “comparables.”
The 1968 regulations established three basic 
transfer pricing methods: (1) a “comparable 
uncontrolled price” method, which was to be 
used if apparently reliable comparables 
information for the related-party transaction in 
question could be located; (2) a “cost-plus” 
method, to be applied to sales of manufactured 
products between related parties, under which 
the arm’s-length nature of pricing was to be 
evaluated according to whether the 
manufacturer’s gross markup on costs was similar 
to the markups obtained in comparable sales 
involving unrelated parties; and (3) a “resale 
price” method (sometimes called a “resale minus” 
method), to be applied to purchaser-resellers of 
products within a commonly controlled group, 
under which pricing was to be evaluated 
according to whether the reseller’s gross profit 
(i.e., its gross margin) was similar to that observed 
in comparable sales between unrelated parties. If 
none of these three methods could be applied, the 
1968 regulations permitted the use of “other” 
methods, which in practice was taken to mean 
individually crafted profit-split methods like the 
“fractional” methods of apportionment to which 
the League of Nations had referred.
In addition to creating the concept of transfer 
pricing “methods,” the 1968 U.S. regulations also 
established the precedent of remarkably wordy 
and complex governmental transfer pricing 
guidance, built around the expectation that tax 
authorities would conduct highly detailed factual 
analyses of the operations and history of each 
taxpayer before proposing tax adjustments. It has 
been my experience that the kinds of 
extraordinarily detailed factual inquiries for 
which the U.S. regulations (and, as will be seen, 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines later 
modeled after the U.S. regulations) call sometimes 
are beyond the practical capacity of even the most 
skilled government tax examiners, or private-
sector tax advisers, to perform comprehensively 
in the context of real-life tax examinations.32
The efficacy of the 1968 regulations was soon 
tested in a series of high-profile court 
controversies in the United States. Most of these 
cases involved a particular fact pattern associated 
with BEPS-style avoidance planning, “outbound 
migrations of intangibles,” which bedeviled U.S. 
tax authorities in the 1960s and with which the 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service continues to 
struggle, largely unsuccessfully, today.33 These 
cases usually have involved the question of 
whether a U.S.-based multinational has received 
adequate compensation, typically in the form of 
royalties, when transferring patent or other 
intellectual property rights to a low- or zero-tax 
32
One prominent commentator in 1968 made the following 
observation:
The first question that arises after a close reading of the proposed 
. . . regulations is how much simplicity and reduction of uncertainty 
will be effected thereby. Their constant references to all facts and 
circumstances and the numerous valuation complexities created by 
the various formulas contained therein, bode ill for ease of 
administration hopes. Moreover, the incredible mass of detail 
contained in the proposed regulations, coupled with their almost 
equally consistent retreats to vaguely worded general principles, 
tend to weaken the cohesive nature of these provisions. The net 
effect of the regulations seems more likely, on balance, to increase 
rather than decrease disputes . . . . It may well be that the new 
proposals, despite their general readability, just cannot be 
effectively applied to concrete situations in practice.
James S. Eustice, “Tax Problems Arising from Transactions Between 
Affiliated or Controlled Corporations,” 23 Tax Law Review 451, 517 
(1968).
33
For summaries of these historical cases, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
“The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. 
International Taxation,” University of Michagan Working Paper (2007), 
at section 4. Recent examples include Veritas Software Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297 (2009); and Amazon.com, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
148 T.C. number 18 (2017) (case remains subject to review by U.S. Court 
of Appeals).
Legislation included in the December 2017 U.S. tax reform act, 
however, revised some of the rules for valuing outbound transfers of 
intangibles from the United States; it is possible, therefore, that the 
“intangibles migration” cases will be of largely historical significance in 
the future. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 466, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) at 
661-662.
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affiliate under a BEPS-style tax plan.34 In almost all 
of these cases, the taxpayers have prevailed 
against the IRS, typically by submitting to courts 
extensive analyses by consulting economists, 
arguing that the royalties received by the U.S. 
parent company, which might on their face 
appear to be at below-market, actually are similar 
to royalties received by companies in 
“comparable” arm’s-length arrangements. 
Although outbound transfers of intangibles, of 
the kind involved in these cases, are unlikely to 
arise frequently in lower-income countries, the 
U.S. cases afford general caution regarding the 
practical limitations of “comparables analysis” as 
the basis for reasonably administrable transfer 
pricing rules.
Continuing official frustration with the 
comparables-based rules resulted in a 
comprehensive congressional review of U.S. 
transfer pricing law in connection with what 
became the Tax Reform Act of 1986.35 Early in the 
consideration of the 1986 Act, the House Ways & 
Means committee speculated that the arm’s-
length approach to transfer pricing laws might be 
untenable as a conceptual matter.36 Ultimately, 
however, Congress in 1986 chose to make only 
minor adjustments to the existing transfer pricing 
rules of the Internal Revenue Code, leaving the 
law’s foundation in the arm’s-length principle 
generally unchanged.37 In addition, following the 
approach it had taken in 1962, Congress in the 
1986 Act instructed the Treasury Department to 
perform a comprehensive study of the problem of 
transfer pricing, to examine whether the 
regulations should be changed “in any respect.”
The Treasury issued its report on transfer 
pricing, usually referred to as the Treasury “White 
Paper,” in 1988.38 The report did not recommend 
wholesale replacement of the arm’s-length 
standard with a formulary approach. The White 
Paper, however, introduced a novel approach to 
transfer pricing enforcement that contains some 
elements of a formulary approach, and which 
fundamentally changed how tax authorities 
around the world try to enforce the arm’s-length 
principle.
The White Paper recommended the creation 
of a new transfer pricing method, which Treasury 
labeled the “basic arm’s-length return method,” 
or “BALRM.” The method appears to have been 
conceived originally largely as a means of 
addressing the pricing of outbound transfers of 
intangibles by U.S. parent companies; although, 
as will be seen, its use in other contexts has 
become substantially more important. Under 
BALRM, the IRS would have examined the level 
of profitability being earned by the low- or zero-
tax affiliate within an intangibles-centered 
avoidance arrangement. If the level of profit 
earned by the affiliate seemed higher than 
reasonable in view of the actual functions 
performed by the affiliate — which, under the 
typical BEPS-style avoidance plan, would be 
minimal — the excess profit would be assumed 
attributable to the intangible that had been 
transferred by the U.S. parent and included in the 
34
For example, a U.S.-based multinational in the pharmaceuticals 
business might have developed, through research and development in 
the United States, a valuable patent to a new drug, enjoying large U.S. 
tax deductions in the process. Then, pursuing the format of an 
intangibles-centered avoidance plan described in Chapter 2, the U.S. 
might have licensed the patent to a low- or zero-tax affiliate in return for 
a royalty of 5 percent of sales; and the affiliate might then have on-
licensed the rights to companies operating around the world for a 
royalty of 10 percent of sales. This arrangement would permit the rapid 
accumulation of high levels of profit within the low- or zero-tax 
company. The U.S. tax authorities have typically argued in this kind of 
situation that the royalty initially paid by the low- or zero-tax company 
(five percent in this example) is below arm’s-length levels, thereby 
depriving the United States of adequate taxable income from the 
arrangement.
35
The following discussion, of the U.S. 1986 Reform Act and the 
ensuing Treasury Department “white paper” on transfer pricing, is 
based on Durst & Culbertson, note 31 above, at 64-77.
36
The Committee said:
A fundamental problem is the fact that the relationship between 
related parties is different from that of unrelated parties. Observers 
have noted that multinational companies operate as an economic 
unit, and not “as if” they were unrelated to their foreign 
subsidiaries.
H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 424 (footnote 
omitted).
37
In particular, Congress added the “commensurate with income 
rule” to Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which was 
intended to permit the IRS, in a tax controversy involving the arm’s-
length level of a royalty that should be received in return for the 
outbound transfer of an intangible, to treat as evidence the level of 
income actually earned by a low- or zero-tax company from the 
intangible, even though that knowledge would not have been available 
to the multinational group at the time the transfer was made. At the 
time, many viewed the new rule as an alarming departure from the 
arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing. In practice, however, the 
commensurate with income rule appears to have had little if any effect 
on the outcome of tax controversies in the more than 30 years since its 
enactment.
38
The White Paper, and the international controversy over transfer 
pricing laws that followed, are discussed in detail in Durst & Culbertson, 
note 31 above, at 64-88.
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parent’s U.S. taxable income. The net effect would 
be to increase the royalty paid by the low- or zero-
tax subsidiary back to the United States.
Even when seen primarily as a means of 
addressing the longstanding U.S. problem of 
outbound migrations of intangibles, the proposed 
BALRM approach of attributing to specified 
corporations market levels of “routine” income, 
would have been criticized by many as an 
excessive departure from the arm’s-length 
paradigm. By the late 1980s, however, the BALRM 
proposal also had become embroiled in a transfer 
pricing dispute of a different kind, between the 
United States and some of its major trading 
partners, including, notably, Japan.
The root of the controversy was a substantial 
decline in the value of the U.S. dollar during the 
second half of the 1980s against a number of 
world currencies, especially the Japanese yen. 
This was a period in which Japanese 
manufacturers of automobiles, and other durable 
goods like industrial machinery, were making 
dramatic inroads in the U.S. marketplace. The 
rapid appreciation of the yen versus the dollar 
made it very difficult for manufacturers to build 
cars and other expensive products in Japan, 
paying for labor and supplies in yen, and to sell 
the products profitably, for depreciated dollars, in 
the United States.
Japanese manufacturing groups therefore 
were experiencing losses, or substandard levels of 
profitability, from their U.S. operations. The 
Japanese companies, supported by Japan’s 
National Tax Administration, argued that for tax 
purposes, the losses or other substandard results 
should be shared between the Japanese parent 
company and its distribution subsidiary in the 
United States. The U.S. IRS, however, argued that 
the distribution subsidiary was performing a 
service for its parent company for which it should 
be compensated, even if for the time being the 
corporate group’s U.S. operations, as a whole, 
were experiencing losses or unusually low 
profitability.39
Japan and other trading partners of the United 
States feared that the Internal Revenue Service 
would use the BALRM approach, contrary to 
international tradition, as a de facto minimum tax 
on the operations of U.S. distribution subsidiaries 
of foreign-owned manufacturing groups. 
Moreover, it appeared the United States 
envisioned applying the new approach on a 
somewhat mechanical basis, under which 
economists employed by the IRS would be 
permitted to estimate reasonable minimum levels 
of income for foreign-owned U.S. subsidiaries, 
without the need to conduct factually intensive, 
case-by-case analyses of potentially relevant 
“comparables.”
Alarmed trading partners convened what 
turned into a multi-year session of the OECD’s tax 
arm, to try to forge a compromise between the 
U.S. and foreign positions with respect to net-
income benchmarking of subsidiaries. The 
negotiations in the OECD were, at times, 
unusually heated for that forum, and the debates 
are still sometimes referred to laconically as the 
“great transfer pricing wars” of the early 1990s. 
The result was the release in 1994 of new U.S. 
transfer pricing regulations, and the near-
simultaneous release of a set of OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines in 1995.40
In response to concerns that the proposed 
BALRM method would be applied overly 
mechanically, the new U.S. regulations 
introduced a new transfer pricing method called 
the “comparable profits method (CPM),” and the 
1995 OECD guidelines introduced an essentially 
identical method called the “transactional net 
margin method (TNMM).”41 Under TNMM, tax 
authorities are permitted to require that a local 
subsidiary of a multinational group earn at least a 
minimum level of income, commensurate with 
the functions the subsidiary performs and the 
business risks that it faces. However, the tax 
authority is required to base its determination of a 
39
See generally Joseph H. Guttentag & Toshio Miyatake, “Transfer 
Pricing: U.S. and Japanese Views,” Tax Notes Int’l, Feb. 7, 1994, p. 375; 
“Tax Experts Say Japan Moving Toward Profit Splits as Key Pricing 
Method,” Daily Tax Report (BNA), June 2, 1994 at D-3; Akira Akamatsu, 
“Japanese Competent Authority Discusses U.S. APA Procedure,” Tax 
Notes Int’l, Apr. 7, 1997, p. 1109.
40
The 1994 U.S. regulations and 1995 OECD Guidelines are described 
in Durst & Culbertson, note 31 above, at 90-98.
41
Despite the differing names of the U.S. and OECD methods, in 
practice the two methods are applied identically. See Robert E. 
Culbertson, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Smelling the Flowers at the 
OECD’s (Last) Resort,” Tax Notes Int’l, Aug. 7, 1995, p. 370. This book will 
use the OECD terminology and call the method “TNMM,” as that is the 
term generally used in countries other than the United States.
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minimum permissible level of income only on the 
basis of a case-by-case factual analysis of the 
subsidiary, including a search for financial 
information on companies that are “comparable” 
to the subsidiary under examination.
Here is how a tax authority is, in theory, 
supposed to apply TNMM in ensuring, for 
example, that a local distributor of brand-name 
farming equipment, established in a lower-
income country by a multinational group, earns 
adequate income from its operations:42 First, the 
local tax authority is to perform a detailed 
“functional analysis” of the taxpayer (called the 
“tested party” in the language of TNMM), to 
obtain an understanding of how its business 
operates. For example, does the distributor 
perform only routine functions like the receipt 
and delivery of products, or does the distributor 
also perform extensive advertising functions for 
which additional income might be expected? 
Then, after having completed the functional 
analysis, the tax authority is to review 
commercially available electronic databases of 
financial information gathered from publicly 
traded companies, to locate companies that 
perform functions comparable to those of the 
tested party but are independent, in the sense of 
not being parts of commonly controlled business 
groups. If any reasonably comparable 
independent distributors of brand-name farming 
equipment are identified through the database 
search, their operating profit margins are 
subjected to statistical analysis. If the actual 
operating profit margin of the tested party is not 
below the median of the comparables’ margins by 
a statistically significant extent, the tested party’s 
results are accepted as reflecting arm’s-length 
pricing in its transactions with the other members 
of its multinational group. If, however, the tested 
party’s results fall below the median of the 
comparables’ results to a statistically significant 
extent, then the tax authority is permitted to 
adjust the tested party’s income, for tax purposes, 
up to the median.
The insistence of the OECD Guidelines that 
tax authorities apply TNMM only based on 
detailed functional analyses of the tested party, 
and that tax authorities apply the method by 
reference to data from uncontrolled comparables, 
reflected the continuing concerns of the trading 
partners of the United States within the OECD. 
The thinking at the time was, in my observation, 
that by placing formidable procedural hurdles in 
the way of successful application of the TNMM, 
countries’ tax authorities would be able to apply 
the new method successfully only in the case of 
relatively egregious income-stripping by locally 
operating subsidiaries.
The negotiators at the OECD do not appear to 
have had BEPS-style avoidance structures 
prominently in mind when hammering out the 
details of new transactional net margin method in 
the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it soon became clear 
that TNMM was the natural — and as a practical 
matter, the only — OECD-approved transfer 
pricing method potentially available for tax 
authorities, including those in low-income 
countries, to use in seeking to enforce reasonable 
minimum levels of incomes for the “stripped risk” 
distributors, manufacturers and service providers 
that figure prominently in BEPS-style tax 
planning arrangements. Indeed, TNMM appears 
to have become the world’s most commonly 
applied transfer pricing method.43
Despite the very wide application of TNMM 
around the world, however, tax administrations, 
even in the world’s wealthiest countries, have 
never been able to administer the TNMM 
effectively. The root of the problem lies in the 
OECD’s insistence that tax authorities apply the 
method only by reference to searches for financial 
data for “uncontrolled comparables.” Typically, 
tax authorities are simply unable to locate 
reasonably satisfactory uncontrolled comparables 
for the kinds of “stripped-risk” distributors, 
manufacturers, and service providers that 
multinational groups establish as part of their tax 
planning structures.
Part of the problem is that uncontrolled, 
independent businesses never enjoy the high 
degree of insulation from business risks that 
intragroup contracts afford to the limited-risk 
entities that multinational groups establish under 
BEPS-style plans. Therefore, the uncontrolled 
42
Rules governing the TNMM are contained in Paragraphs 2.64 to 
2.113 of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, as revised in 2017 following the 
OECD’s BEPS studies.
43
See Collier & Andrus, note 5 above, at 111.
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companies that tax authorities might identify 
through searches of financial databases are 
systematically noncomparable, in economic 
terms, to the “tested parties” that the tax 
authorities are trying to examine. In addition, 
those independent distributors, manufacturers, 
and service providers that might happen to exist, 
and to perform functions roughly similar to those 
of the tested parties in TNMM examinations, are 
unlikely to sell stock or other securities on public 
exchanges, so that their financial information 
typically is not included in available financial 
databases.
The practical result is that tax authorities 
typically are not able to identify enough high-
quality comparables to apply TNMM persuasively 
in determining acceptable arm’s-length margins for 
local distributors, manufacturers, and service 
providers within multinational groups. Any 
comparables that might be identified are likely to 
differ in obvious ways from the stripped-risk entity 
that is being examined. For example, efforts to 
locate purported comparables for, say, a local 
distributor of high-margin, branded food or 
beverages might result in the identification of a few 
local wholesale food distributors which handle 
lower-margin, unbranded products, at volumes 
significantly lower than those of the large brand-
name distributors.
Even with highly imperfect matches of this 
kind accepted, moreover, searches typically result 
in very small sample sizes of purported 
comparables: in my experience, sample sizes of 
only five or six purported comparables are often 
used in practice. Tax authorities then attempt, 
following the OECD Guidelines, to use statistical 
techniques to determine an “arm’s-length range” 
of profitability for the taxpayer that is under 
examination; and if the taxpayer’s actual 
profitability is within that range, the taxpayer will 
be considered to have satisfied the arm’s-length 
pricing standard under the Guidelines.44 Basic 
statistical theory, however, makes clear that it is 
impossible to conduct reliable statistical analyses 
using very small sample sizes, especially when 
the data being used are of low quality to begin 
with.45 The result is that the statistical ranges 
estimated in practice tend to be far too wide to be 
of real use in tax administration: basically, the 
range is so wide that even implausibly low 
margins are found to be within the “arm’s-length 
range.” In sum, TNMM as used around the world 
today provides tax administrations with only a 
very flawed means of attempting to prevent 
excessive profit-shifting by the kinds of limited-
risk distributors, manufacturers, and service 
providers that are used under BEPS-style tax 
planning structures.
This book will return to the topic of transfer 
pricing rules, and in particular the TNMM, in 
Chapter 4, which analyzes the OECD’s recent 
BEPS reports. As will be described in Chapter 4, 
the OECD and other international organizations 
have recognized the importance of rectifying the 
problem of insufficient comparables if TNMM is 
to function effectively in tax administration, 
especially in developing countries.46 Chapter 4 
will consider the potential feasibility of 
improving the operation of the TNMM as a 
component of policies to enable lower-income 
country tax administrations to achieve better 
control over profit-shifting from their 
jurisdictions.
Profit-Shifting Through Interest Deductions
As described in Chapter 2, a very common 
kind of BEPS-style tax avoidance structure is 
based on the lending of money between members 
of multinational groups. Members of 
multinational groups routinely establish 
“financing subsidiaries” in low- or zero-tax 
countries and fund the financing subsidiaries 
with large amounts of cash. The financing 
subsidiaries then extend loans to the group’s 
44
For example, in examining a particular stripped-risk distributor, a 
tax authority might locate, using commercially available databases, 
financial information for six at least arguable uncontrolled comparables. 
Those six comparables might have a medium operating margin of 2.7 
percent of sales; and applying some form of statistical technique to the 
available data, the tax authority might determine an “arm’s length 
range” of operating margins extending from 1.0 to 4.5 percent. So long as 
the tested party has earned an operating margin of at least 1.0 percent, 
therefore, the tested party will be considered, in its operations, to have 
complied with the arm’s-length standard.
45
See generally Durst & Culbertson, note 31 above, at 108-114, which 
contains a more extended and annotated discussion of the shortcomings 
of statistical analyses under TNMM. See also Michael C. Durst, “Making 
Transfer Pricing Work for Developing Countries,” Tax Notes Int’l, Dec. 
13, 2010, p. 851.
46
See especially Platform for Collaboration on Tax (group comprised 
of OECD, World Bank, IMF, and United Nations), “A Toolkit for 
Addressing Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer 
Pricing Analyses” (2017).
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various operating subsidiaries (which often are 
risk-limited companies established pursuant to 
BEPS planning) around the world. The operating 
subsidiaries pay interest on the loans, which they 
deduct for tax purposes, thereby reducing their 
tax bills in the countries where they are located. 
There is no corresponding tax cost when the 
interest is received by the low- or zero-tax 
financing company, so that the overall result is to 
reduce the multinational group’s global tax bill.
Corporate income tax laws around the world 
typically allow corporations to deduct interest on 
loans; and claiming a deduction for interest is not 
in itself evidence of tax avoidance. The problem, 
however, is that under BEPS-style avoidance 
plans, risk-limited subsidiaries can incur interest-
bearing debt from related lenders, especially low- 
and zero-tax financing companies, far in excess of 
the level of debt that is necessary for a company to 
incur for business reasons.
For illustration, consider the situation of a 
global multinational group as a whole. The group 
might find it desirable, for business reasons, to 
borrow money from banks and other outside 
lenders to a certain extent: say, to the point at 
which the group’s “debt-to-equity ratio” — that is, 
its ratio of debt outstanding to the total value of its 
outstanding stock — is 1.5 to 1 (a typical debt-to-
equity ratio for companies in some industries). 
The group will refrain from borrowing more, 
because then its debt will become too risky, 
forcing the group to pay overly high interest rates; 
also, incurring high levels of debt might subject 
the group to an excessive risk of bankruptcy if 
economic conditions change for the worse. Thus, 
at arm’s length, there are natural limits to a 
multinational group’s desire to incur additional 
debt to outside lenders.
Within a commonly owned multinational 
group, however, there are no substantial business 
constraints on the volume of loans made from one 
group member to another: as a matter of economic 
reality, since the same parent company owns the 
lender and the borrower, the loans place no one at 
genuine economic risk. The tax benefits that can 
be derived from the loans, nevertheless, can be 
very large. Not surprisingly, therefore, financing 
companies under BEPS-style planning structures 
often lend very large sums to group members 
operating in countries around the world, causing 
those members to be much more heavily indebted 
than the group as a whole. For example, whereas 
a group as a whole may have a debt-to-equity 
ratio of 1.5 to 1, some companies within the group 
might have ratios of, say, 3 or 4 to 1. This kind of 
leverage permits massive amounts of tax 
avoidance through deduction of interest paid to 
group financing companies in low- or zero-tax 
countries.
Although, in theory, the arm’s-length 
principle should limit the amount of debt between 
related parties to levels justified by bona fide 
business considerations, in practice the OECD’s 
transfer pricing methods, including TNMM, do 
not impose effective limits on tax-avoidance 
through related-party lending arrangements. This 
is largely because the OECD’s transfer pricing 
methods, including TNMM, seek to place a floor 
on the amount of “operating income” that a 
subsidiary is treated as earning for tax purposes 
— and “operating income” in accounting 
terminology means income before the deduction of 
interest paid by an entity. Therefore, even if a 
company earns, say, the minimum operating 
profit margin required by TNMM, the company 
can reduce its taxable income further by 
deducting interest paid, even to related parties.47 
The inability of transfer pricing methods, 
especially the commonly used TNMM, to 
meaningfully limit taxpayers’ interest expenses 
represents a serious loophole in the OECD’s 
approach to controlling BEPS-style tax planning.
For many decades, countries around the 
world have maintained rules, separate from their 
transfer pricing rules, that attempt to limit 
deductions for interest paid by a company to 
related lenders based on whether the company is 
“thinly capitalized” — that is, whether the 
corporation has more debt relative to equity than 
seems reasonable given business needs.48 For 
47
For example, consider a member of a multinational group that 
distributes products in a particular country, and has sales revenue 
during the year of $10 million. Despite the difficulties of applying 
TNMM, the tax authorities of the country establish successfully that the 
distributor should earn an operating margin of at least 3 percent, so that 
the distributor should earn an operating income of at least $300,000. The 
distributor nevertheless remains free under the transfer pricing rules to 
reduce its taxable income below $300,000, perhaps even to zero, by 
claiming deductions for interest on loans from related parties.
48
These kinds of rules are discussed in the OECD’s report on BEPS 
Action 4, which will be discussed below in Chapter 4.
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example, a country’s statute might disallow 
deductions for interest on a company’s loans, to 
the extent the company’s debt-to-equity ratio 
exceeds, say, 3 to 1. This “thin capitalization” 
approach to the control of interest deductions has 
never been very effective, however, because (i) the 
debt-to-equity ratios specified have tended to be 
generous, allowing for the deduction of interest 
substantially in excess of most companies’ 
genuine business needs, and (ii) companies have 
been able to avoid application of the statutes by 
contributing cash to the taxpayer company, thus 
increasing the value of its equity and artificially 
reducing the company’s debt-to-equity ratio.
As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, the 
OECD has recommended in its BEPS reports that 
countries adopt tighter limitations on corporate 
interest deductions, generally limiting interest 
deductions to 30 percent of a company’s net 
income before payment of interest. Because these 
rules don’t depend on a company’s debt-to-equity 
ratio, they can’t be avoided by injections of 
additional cash to the company. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, the OECD has modeled its 
recommendation on income-based interest 
limitations that some, mainly relatively wealthy, 
countries have adopted over about the past ten 
years.
As will be seen in Chapter 4, however, by the 
OECD’s own analysis, the recommended 30-
percent limitation would allow companies to 
continue to deduct interest on substantially larger 
loans than companies in most industries need to 
meet their genuine business needs. Therefore, 
even if lower-income countries adopt the OECD 
recommendation, companies in the countries will 
still be able to accomplish substantial tax 
avoidance through the payment of interest on 
loans from low- or zero-tax finance companies. 
Moreover, because of perceived pressures of tax 
competition, it is not clear that many, if any, lower-
income countries will choose to adopt even the 
limited controls on interest deductions that the 
OECD has recommended.
Conclusion: Outlook for Chapter 4
The recent OECD BEPS studies are the 
consequence of an apparent shift in the global 
political environment following the 2008 
Financial Crisis; this shift generated calls for 
reforms of international tax laws that would 
permit their administration and enforcement with 
greater predictability and effectiveness. The 
chapter just completed has sought to outline the 
history of the elements of international tax law 
that have been most central to the evolution of 
base erosion and profit shifting over the years, 
including transfer pricing laws, CFC rules, and 
rules governing the deductibility of interest paid 
by companies to other members of their corporate 
groups. The chapter has argued that all three of 
these areas of law have developed in ways that 
limit their effectiveness as means of controlling 
international tax avoidance. The apparent 
shortcomings in these areas of law seem to derive, 
at least in part, to political reluctance among 
policymakers to impose strong constraints on 
BEPS-style tax planning.
Chapter 4 will next focus on the OECD’s BEPS 
process, and particularly on the extent to which 
the BEPS analyses have generated promising 
proposals for reform in these three central areas of 
international tax law. To what extent has the BEPS 
process transcended the political constraints that 
historically have limited the development of more 
administrable and enforceable international tax 
laws? To what extent are the BEPS 
recommendations likely to generate substantial 
improvements in the revenue performance of 
countries around the world, especially those 
lower-income countries where the potential social 
benefits from additional corporate tax revenues 
appears to be greatest? Chapter 5 then will seek to 
articulate a mix of policy instruments, including 
measures both from within and outside the scope 
of the BEPS studies, which might offer practical 
promise for the enhancement of revenues from 
the corporate income tax in lower-income 
countries. 
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